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Paper $17.00. 
Mark Strassel 
Andrew Koppelman teaches both political science and law, 
and it is thus unsurprising that his book The Gay Rights Question 
in Contemporary American Law incorporates both political and 
constitutional theory in his analysis. This review will focus on the 
latter, although there is every reason to believe that his analysis 
is just as thought-provoking in his use of political theory. 
The issues and analyses discussed in this book are hotly de-
bated. The utter lack of consensus that exists can be explained, 
at least in part, by the Court's not having been sufficiently clear 
in what it has held and why, whether in cases involving lesbian, 
gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) rights in particular or 
constitutional law more generally. It thus should be unsurprising 
that even those who agree that same-sex marriage should be 
recognized may nonetheless disagree about the best constitu-
tional analysis of the cases discussed in this book. 
Romer v. Evans/ one of the first cases discussed by Kop-
pelman, is a good illustration of a case which has been given nu-
merous interpretations, both by commentators and by the Jus-
tices themselves. In Romer, the Court struck down Amendment 
2, an amendment to the Colorado Constitution passed by refer-
endum, which precluded localities from offering anti-
I. Associate Professor of Law, Northwestern University. 
2. Trustees Professor of Law, Capital University. I would like to thank Professors 
Brian Bix and James Beattie for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this review. I 
am solely responsible for any remaining errors. 
3. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
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discrimination protection on the basis of orientation. Koppelman 
writes, 
Romer's rule [ ]may [ ] be summarized-if a law targets a 
narrowly defined group and then imposes upon it disabilities 
that are so broad and undifferentiated as to bear no discerni-
ble relationship to any legitimate governmental interest, then 
the court will infer that the law's purpose is simply to harm 
that group, and so will invalidate the law. (p. 8) 
Certainly, this is one possible reading of Romer, although 
the Court's subsequent actions have made this interpretation less 
plausible. For example, as Koppelman notes, (seep. 162 n.142) 
the electorate in Cincinnati, Ohio, passed a referendum that was 
quite similar in content to Amendment 2. The constitutionality 
of that referendum was upheld by the Sixth Circuit in Equality 
Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati.4 The 
Supreme Court vacated and remanded the Sixth Circuit opinion 
because the Court had decided Romer in the interirn.5 The Sixth 
Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the referendum on re-
mand and, this time, the Court declined to grant certiorari.6 
It is difficult to know what, if anything, to make of the 
Court's denial of certiorari after the Sixth Circuit's ruling on re-
mand was appealed.7 However, were Koppleman's reading of 
Romer correct, the Court presumably would have struck down 
the Cincinnati referendum as well. The language contained in 
the Cincinnati and Colorado referendum propositions was strik-
ingly similar and it would be difficult if not impossible to distin-
guish the cases on the basis of the content of the propositions 
submitted to the voters. While Romer clearly stands for the 
proposition that a statute lacking any rational relationship to le-
gitimate state interests will be struck down even on rational basis 
review,8 that was uncontroversial even before the Court decided 
Romer. What is more controversial is Koppelman's claim about 
when the Court will infer that a statute is motivated by animus 
4. 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995) vacated and remanded, 518 U.S. 1001 (1996), reaf-
firmed on remand, 128 F.3d 289 (1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 943 (1998). 
5. Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 518 U.S. 
1001 (1996). 
6. See Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 525 
u.s. 943 (1998). 
7. See, for example, id. at 944 (Stevens, 1., concurring) ("The Court's action today 
should not be interpreted either as an independent construction of the charter or as an 
expression of its views about the underlying issues that the parties have debated at 
length.") 
8. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 632. 
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and, regrettably, Equality Foundation suggests that the Court is 
less willing to infer animus than Koppelman implies. 
Koppelman suggests that were the Court to have recognized 
that discrimination on the basis of orientation was sex discrimi-
nation, then Romer would have been easily explainable by ap-
pealing to the Hunter v. Erickson9 line of cases. (p. 24) Yet, not-
withstanding the Romer Court's declining to adopt that tack 
expressly10 and notwithstanding the Court's reluctance to recog-
nize orientation discrimination as a form of sex discrimination, a 
Hunter analysis may nonetheless provide the best explanation of 
Romer and the failure to grant certiorari when Equality Founda-
tion was again appealed. 
First, the Hunter voting rights analysis does not only protect 
the rights of suspect or quasi-suspect classes and, for example, 
has been held by a state intermediate appellate court to protect 
the voting rights of individuals on the basis of sexual orientation 
and HIV status.11 Second, and more relevant to why the Romer 
Court might have refused to grant certiorari in Equality Founda-
tion, the Sixth Circuit distinguished Romer by appealing to con-
siderations that might be thought important in a Hunter analysis, 
e.g., that the Cincinnati referendum was at the lowest political 
level.12 While the Sixth Circuit's analysis in Equality Foundation 
is itself subject to criticism, e.g., because Hunter itself involved 
an invidious attempt to alter a minority's voting rights at the 
lowest politicallevel,13 the Sixth Circuit was clearly implying that 
Romer is best understood as a Hunter voting rights case and the 
Court permitted that analysis to stand. 
Koppelman suggests that Bowers v. Hardwick may be a 
stumbling block to the recognition that orientation is a quasi-
suspect classification. (p. 30) Certainly, the anti-gay tone of 
Bowers is hard to mistake/4 and Bowers is open to a variety of 
9. 393 U.S. 385 (1969). 
10. The Colorado Supreme Court had offered a Hunter analysis, and the Romer 
Court affirmed, although "on a rationale different from that adopted by the State Su-
preme Court." See Romer, 517 U.S. at 626. 
II. See Citizens for Responsible Behavior v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 648 (Ct. 
App. 1991). 
12. See Equality Foundation, 128 F.3d at 296-97. See also Equality Foundation, 518 
U.S. at 1001 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that this case involves a decision by the 
lowest electoral subunit). 
13. In Hunter, the citizens of Akron had adopted an amendment to the City Char-
ter via referendum that required voter ratification of ordinances adopted by the City 
Council to preclude housing discrimination. 393 U.S. at 386. 
14. See Watkins v. United States Army, 837 F.2d 1428, 1453 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting), superseded by 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988), withdrawn on 
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interpretations. Yet, much of the analysis in Bowers established 
that sodomy was not protected by the right to privacy rather 
than that only same-sex sodomy was not protected. On a chari-
table interpretation of the Bowers opinion, the Court was ad-
dressing same-sex sodomy because that was the issue before the 
Court. It is for this very reason that, as Koppelman points out, 
states may be constitutionally permitted to prohibit sodomy gen-
erally but nonetheless be precluded by equal protection con-
straints from solely prohibiting same-sex sodomy. (p. 32) 
The Bowers stumbling block seems more attitudinal than 
constitutional. Thus, if the right to privacy protected by the Fed-
eral Constitution does not include the right to engage in sodomy 
with a same-sex or different sex partner outside the confines of 
marriage, 15 Bowers does not provide the constitutional stumbling 
block to the recognition of orientation as a suspect or quasi-
suspect classification that has sometimes been suggested.16 A 
separate question is whether the case nonetheless symbolizes the 
reluctance of some members of the Court to permit the LGBT 
community to have more than second-class status/7 but that will 
not be discussed here. 
Koppelman writes, "Reasonable people disagree about 
whether hatred and stereotyping of gays is sufficiently pervasive 
in our society to warrant judicial suspicion of laws that discrimi-
nate on the basis of sexual orientation." (p. 28) Yet, he had pre-
viously made a convincing case that such hatred and stereotyp-
ing were pervasive. (pp. 21-22) What seems to be in dispute is 
not whether the hatred is pervasive but whether it is wrong. For 
example, in his Romer dissent, Justice Scalia did not attempt to 
deny but, rather, to justify the existence of animus on the basis of 
orientation.18 
Koppelman believes that those seeking to advance the 
LGBT legal cause are likely to be unsuccessful if their legal fo-
cus is on the right to privacy protected by the Federal Constitu-
tion. Although suggesting that the right to privacy is pretty 
rehearing by 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) ("The anti-homosexual thrust of Hardwick, and 
the Court's willingness to condone anti-homosexual animus in the actions of the govern-
ment, are clear.") 
15. See, for example, Scare v. Lopes, 660 A.2d 707,710 (R.I. 1995) (nonmarital sod-
omy not protected by Federal Constitution). 
16. See, for example, Romer, 517 U.S. at 640-41 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting 
that Bowers somehow establishes the constitutionality of Amendment 2). 
17. See, for example, id. at 636-53 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia's dissenting 
opinion was joined by both Justices Thomas and Rehnquist. 
18. See id. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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firmly entrenched in American jurisprudence, (p. 39) he seems 
wary of relying on that right, in part because it is not expressly 
included in the constitutional text (p. 36) and in part because the 
Court has not offered clear guidelines to help the lower courts 
determine what it protects and what it does not. (p. 44) While 
the Court has sometimes suggested that a "liberty must be 
'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition"'19 to qualify 
as protected by the right to privacy, (p. 43) Koppelman rightly 
suggests that this test is too indeterminate. 
The difficulty with the history and tradition test, however, is 
not merely that it is too indeterminate but that it is unable to ac-
count for those interests that have been recognized as protected 
by the right to privacy. Contraception and abortion, for example, 
had been proscribed for at least 80 years when the Court struck 
down laws prohibiting them,20 and it is difficult to see how prac-
tices proscribed for several decades could be described as deeply 
rooted within the nation's history and traditions. Thus, the his-
tory and tradition test is simply the wrong test to determine what 
is protected by the right to privacy and what is not. The point 
here of course is not that Koppleman made an error when refer-
ring to that test but, rather, that the Court cannot in good faith 
claim that such a test accounts for what the right to privacy pro-
tects, implicit or explicit claims to the contrary notwithstanding. 
Koppelman rightly suggests that society can impose incest 
restrictions to protect the dynamics between parent and child (p. 
48). He then suggests that it seems difficult to draw any abstract 
limit on government's power to regulate sexual behavior if, in-
deed, society has a legitimate interest in regulating incest. Yet, it 
is not at all clear why that is so. Certainly, there is no need to 
maintain an incest-like taboo on same-sex relations to preserve 
the monogamous family. There need be no poisoning of the par-
ent-child relation when the parent has sexual relations with her 
same-sex or, for that matter, different-sex, adult partner, and the 
category of "monogamous families" should include same-sex 
parents who are raising their children just as it includes different-
sex parents (whether or not married) who are raising their chil-
dren. 
19. Quoting Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989). 
20. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447 (1972) (Massachusetts statute prohib-
iting contraception stemmed from statute passed in 1879); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 
501 (1961) (Connecticut contraception statute passed in 1879). See also Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113, 116 (1973) (Texas statutes at issue prohibiting abortion were typical of those in 
effect for about a century). 
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Koppelman suggests that a close reading of the right to pri-
vacy cases makes clear that they "are less concerned with pro-
moting sexual liberty than they are with promoting social cohe-
sion and deference to traditional institutions." (p. 49) Yet, it is 
hardly as if one must choose between sexual liberty on the one 
hand and deference to traditional institutions on the other. 
Commentators can debate whether the Court was "concerned 
with social stability" (p. 50) when holding that the right to pri-
vacy protected access to contraception and abortion, but the 
right to privacy cases do not seem plausibly characterized as de-
ferring to traditional institutions. Such a reading ignores some of 
the other cases handed down during the period under discus-
sion-for example, Stanley v. Illinoi?-1 in which the Court struck 
down an Illinois statute under which "the children of unwed fa-
thers become wards of the State upon the death of the 
mother. '"22 Holding such a statute unconstitutional hardly in-
volved deference to traditional institutions such as marriage. 
Koppelman implies that his interpretation of the right to 
privacy cases as representing deference to traditional institutions 
is supported by Belle Terre v. Boraas,23 which he describes as 
"upholding an ordinance that prohibited persons unrelated by 
blood marriage, or adoption from living together." (p. 167 n.102) 
Yet, Belle Terre does not seem particularly supportive of mar-
riage, and the ordinance itself is better described as limiting the 
number of unrelated persons who might live together. The Belle 
Terre Court specifically rejected the claim that the ordinance 
"reeks with an animosity to unmarried couples who live to-
gether. There is no evidence to support it; and the provision of 
the ordinance bringing within the definition of a 'family' two 
unmarried people belies the charge. "24 The Court considered the 
objection "that if two unmarried people can constitute a 'family,' 
there is no reason why three or four may not,"25 but noted that 
"every line drawn by a leRislature leaves some out that might 
well have been included." 6 While one might disagree with the 
Court about the reasonableness of precluding three of four unre-
lated persons from living together, one would be wrong to infer 
21. 405 u.s. 645 (1972). 
22. Id. at 646. 
23. 416 u.s. 1 (1974). 
24. Id. at 8. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. 
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that the Belle Terre Court was upholding an ordinance preclud-
ing non-marital couples from cohabiting. 
It is important to be able to point to options in addition to 
sexual liberty on the one hand and traditional institutions on the 
other insofar as one wishes to capture some of the invidious as-
pects of the current same-sex marriage bans. At least one of the 
stereotypical views of individuals with a same-sex orientation is 
that they are always seeking sexual gratification/7 and implying 
that Bowers simply involves a choice between tradition and li-
centiousness plays into the stereotyping that Koppelman rightly 
criticizes. (p. 24) While Koppelman criticizes Hardwick as a 
"disastrously bad piece of judicial craftsmanship," (p. 50) one 
might rightly be surprised by his claim that "one cannot say that 
the result in Hardwick is not consistent with the preceding pri-
vacy case law." (p. 50) Many not only can but do make such a 
claim, citing a variety of cases in support. 
Koppelman is likely correct that the right to privacy pro-
tected by the Federal Constitution will not be construed as pro-
tecting the right to marry a same-sex partner. However, that is 
not because the right to privacy jurisprudence cannot or even 
should not be read to include such a right but because of the 
Court's cramped reading of its own jurisprudence in this area. 
State constitutions also protect the right to privacy, and pressing 
claims involving the right to privacy protections guaranteed by 
the state constitutions has been and may continue to be useful 
when seeking to secure protections for the LGBT community.28 
Koppelman argues that much discrimination against gays 
and lesbians is sex discrimination because it is designed to pro-
mote particular gender roles. (p. 64) His argument is plausible-
some of the discrimination against the LGBT community is 
likely motivated by the desire to discourage individuals from 
adopting nontraditional gender roles or attitudes, or engaging in 
"sex-inappropriate" behaviors. (See p. 64.) However, he does 
not adequately differentiate and discuss a different sex discrimi-
nation argument that has been accepted by some courts. Con-
sider, for example, a statute that prohibits individuals of the 
same sex from marrying. One criticism of such a ban is that it in-
27. See Richard D. Mohr, Gays and Justice: A Study of Ethics, Society, and Law 25 
(Columbia U. Press, 1988) (discussing "the stereotype of gays as sex-crazed maniacs"). 
28. See, for example, Jegley v. Picado, 80 S.W.3d 332 (Ark. 2002) (sodomy statute 
violates right to privacy under state constitution); Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 
1998) (same); Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112 (Mont. 1997) (same); Commonwealth v. 
Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992) (same). 
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valves an attempt to enforce particular gender stereotypes. The 
focus of such a criticism is on what the statute aims to achieve. 
Another criticism, however, is that a same-sex marriage ban ex-
pressly discriminates on the basis of sex because it precludes a 
man from marrying a man but not a woman and because it pre-
cludes a woman from marrying a woman but not a man.29 Here, 
the focus is not on the goal but simply on the classification itself. 
A separate issue is whether an "exceedingly persuasive justifica-
tion"30 can be offered for this sex-based classification, but the fo-
cus is on whether such a classification was made and on whether 
the state can meet its burden for employing such a classification, 
and not solely on whether the classification is designed to rein-
force stereotypical gender roles and attitudes. 
One might contrast a same-sex marriage ban with a statute 
that classifies on the basis of orientation, e.g., an adoption stat-
ute that precludes lesbians or gays from adopting. 31 The former 
prohibits all individuals, regardless of orientation, from marrying 
someone of the same sex and permits them to marry someone of 
a different sex, assuming that other limitations like age or con-
sanguinity are not a bar. The latter precludes anyone, regardless 
of sex, from adopting if he or she has a same-sex orientation. 
The point here should not be misunderstood. Both marriage 
statutes precluding individuals of the same sex from marrying 
and adoption statutes precluding those with a same-sex orienta-
tion from adopting impose substantial burdens on the LGBT 
community. Such statutes obviously impose much greater bur-
dens on individuals with a same-sex orientation than on indi-
viduals with a different-sex orientation and should be held un-
constitutional. Thus, the claim here is not, for example, that 
same-sex marriage bans are constitutionally permissible because 
they permit LGBT individuals to marry, although not their life-
partners?2 Just as the interracial ban at issue in Loving v. Vir-
ginia33 was unconstitutional notwithstanding its permitting indi-
29. Sec Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 64 (Haw. 1993) ("HRS § 572-1, on its face and 
as applied, regulates access to the marital status and its concomitant rights and benefits 
on the basis of the applicants' sex.") 
30. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996) (citing Mississippi Univ. for 
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,724 (1982)). 
31. See Fla. Stat. Ann.§§ 63.042 (3) (West 1997) ("No person eligible to adopt un-
der this statute may adopt if that person is a homosexual.") 
32. Depending upon the laws of the particular state, a post-operative transsexual 
may be able to marry his or her life-partner, even though anyone who saw them would 
say that they were of the same sex. 
33. 388 u.s. 1 (1%7). 
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viduals to marry others of their own race, same-sex marriage 
bans are impermissible notwithstanding their permitting LGBT 
individuals to marry someone of a different sex. 
The point here is merely that statutes prohibiting same-sex 
marriage classify on the basis of sex rather than orientation. 
Those with a same-sex orientation are permitted to marry indi-
viduals of a different sex and individuals with a different-sex ori-
entation are not permitted to marry someone of the same sex. 
As to how often those with a same-sex orientation would want to 
marry someone of a different sex or those with a different-sex 
orientation would want to marry someone of the same sex, e.g., 
to secure financial and emotional if not sexual benefits, that is a 
separate question which need not be addressed here. 
Certainly, it is plausible to claim that the intention of same-
sex marriage bans is to target those with a same-sex orientation, 
but that suggests that the sex-based classification is being used in 
a way that is both over-inclusive and under-inclusive. Thus, at 
least one answer to those who say that sex-discrimination and 
orientation-discrimination are different is not to suggest that all 
instances of the latter are instances of the former, (see pp. 60-61) 
but instead to say that they are different and that same-sex mar-
riage bans are an example of an invidious sex-based rather than 
orientation-based classification. 
Koppelman addresses the New Natural Law (NNL) theo-
rists' attempts to justify same-sex marriage bans. He pays careful 
attention to their arguments and offers a variety of reasons to es-
tablish that their claims are not persuasive. One surprising ele-
ment in his analysis, however, is his suggestion that "there are 
intuitions that most Americans share ... that the NNL theorists 
have defended more thoughtfully and coherently than anyone 
else." (p. 80) 
The NNL theorists try to justify the claim that "whatever 
goods a same-sex couple is capable of achieving together, mar-
riage is simply impossible for them, because of the kind of thing 
that marriage is." (p. 80) Koppelman suggests that while most 
Americans "do not believe that sex is valuable only for purposes 
of procreation," since they "approve of heterosexual marriages 
of the elderly and infertile, for example," they nonetheless be-
lieve that "these cases [marriages involving the infertile or eld-
erly] realize something uniquely valuable that is not realized by 
the same-sex couple." (p. 80) Koppelman concludes that the 
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"NNL's views, while they are often obscure, are not idiosyn-
cratic." (p. 80) 
Yet, it may be that NNL's views about same-sex marriage 
coincide with those of many Americans only in the conclusion 
reached and, further, that the common conclusion may be due to 
a mistake of fact. It may be, for example, that many believe that 
the function of marriage is to provide a setting in which children 
can thrive and also believe, even if mistakenly, either that the 
LGBT c:Jmmunity is not having and raising children or that 
members of the LGBT community cannot be good parents. Pre-
cisely because same-sex couples have children to raise and are 
raising them well, the notion that marriage is important for the 
sake of children militates in favor of rather than against recogni-
tion of same-sex unions. 
While the NNL theorists reach the same conclusion that 
many Americans draw, namely, that marriage is only for two in-
dividuals of different sexes, this does not mean that the NNL 
theory: (1) is internally consistent, (2) captures why many 
Americans believe that marriage should be reserved for differ-
ent-sex couples, or (3) reflects other aspects of domestic rela-
tions law so that it can sensibly be incorporated within or pro-
vide a justification for current law. For purposes here, the 
relevant issue is (3). 
Existing state laws specifying the conditions under which 
individuals might marry do not reflect the NNL theory's account 
of which types of relationships or acts count as marital. For ex-
ample, individuals who do not wish to have children and who are 
only interested in assuring themselves of a consistent sexual 
partner would not be precluded from marrying on that account. 
So, too, individuals who always use contraception or, perhaps, 
who are sterilized so that they can have sexual relations without 
fear of conceiving also will be permitted to marry, and individu-
als who make use of advanced reproductive technologies so that 
they might have and raise children also are not viewed by the 
law as incapable of partaking of the goods of marriage, NNL 
view notwithstanding. 
Just as state laws do not reflect the NNL view of marriage, 
the constitutional jurisprudence regarding the right to marry 
does not either. The Court has articulated numerous interests 
that are implicated in marriage-marriages are expressions of 
emotional support and public commitment, they may involve an 
expression of religious faith or personal dedication, and mar-
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riages may be a pre-condition to the receipt of government bene-
fits.34 These are interests that are shared by both same-sex and 
different-sex couples and simply do not rely on the kind of view 
offered by the NNL theorists. 
In Zablocki v. Redhai/,35 the Court suggested that it "is not 
surprising that the decision to marry has been placed on the 
same level of importance as decisions relating to procreation, 
childbirth, child rearing, and family relationships," because it 
"would make little sense to recognize a right of privacy with re-
spect to other matters of family life and not with respect to the 
decision to enter [into) the relationship that is the foundation of 
the family in our society."36 Same-sex couples not only are rais-
ing children but have legally recognized parent-child relation-
ships protected by the right to privacy. Were the Supreme Court 
to take seriously its own explanations of why the right to marry 
is so important, the Court would recognize that the right to 
marry a same-sex partner is protected by the right to privacy 
guarantees provided by the Federal Constitution. 
The NNL account of marriage neither represents existing 
law nor the constitutional interests implicated in marriage and 
thus can hardly rationalize or justify current state or constitu-
tional law. Just as the history and tradition test does not ade-
quately account for what is included within the right to privacy 
because it excludes too much, the NNL view cannot account for 
which marriages should be recognized as a matter of state or 
constitutional law because it excludes too much. The difficulty 
pointed to here is not Koppelman's rejection of the NNL view 
but rather his implicit or explicit suggestion that such a view ei-
ther represents what most Americans believe or that it somehow 
captures the legal understanding of marriage either as a matter 
of state or constitutional law. Regardless of whether one is con-
vinced by Koppelman's criticisms of that view, the NNL under-
standing of marriage simply does not capture the legal view of 
marriage and thus should not be used to "justify" state refusals 
to recognize same-sex marriages. 
Currently, no state recognizes same-sex marriage, although 
Vermont recognizes civil unions. It seems plausible to believe, 
however, that same-sex marriage will someday be recognized in 
one or more states. When that happens, those states not permit-
34. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95-96 (1987). 
35. 434 u.s. 374 (1978). 
36. Id. at 386. 
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ting such marriages to be celebrated will have to decide whether 
to recognize those same-sex marriages validly celebrated in a dif-
ferent state. 
To understand the issues implicated in the interstate recog-
nition of marriage, it is important to consider some of the differ-
ent.contexts in which this issue might arise. Consider three cate-
gones: 
Category1 
A couple wishes to marry. However, their domicile treats 
their marriage as void and, perhaps, has a law prohibiting their 
evading local law by going to another state to marry. They none-
theless go to another state where their marriage is permitted, 
marry, and then return horne. An issue arises in which the valid-
ity of their marriage is important to establish. 
Category2 
A couple marries in accordance with the law of their domi-
cile and lives there for several years. They then move to a new 
domicile, which would not have permitted the couple to marry 
had they been domiciled there at the time of their union's cele-
bration. An issue arises in which the validity of their marriage is 
important to establish. 
Category3 
A couple marries in their own domicile in accord with local 
law. They vacation in another state, which would not have per-
mitted them to marry had they been domiciled in that state. An 
issue arises in which the validity of their marriage is important to 
establish. 
The strongest case for non-recognition involves the type of 
marriage included in Category1. Assuming that no constitutional 
guarantees are violated by the statute, the law of the domicile at 
the time of the marriage traditionally determines the validity of 
the marriage. This does not mean, however, that a marriage that 
could not have been celebrated in the domicile will not be rec-
ognized even if valid where celebrated. As Koppelman suggests, 
(p. 95) even marriages in this category are valid everywhere if 
valid where celebrated, as long as they do not violate a strong 
public policy of the domicile. 
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It might seem surprising that a state would not permit a 
marriage to be celebrated locally but would nonetheless recog-
nize it if validly celebrated elsewhere. Yet, this is less surprising 
than first appears when one considers the state's interests in 
promoting marriage and in promoting the legitimacy of children. 
Nonetheless, in this kind of case, the couple seems least entitled 
to complain if their domicile refuses to recognize their union. 
They knew that local law prohibited their marriage and went 
elsewhere to evade that law. Of the couples in the three catego-
ries discussed here, this couple is least likely to be thought to 
have had a reasonable and justified expectation that their mar-
riage would be recognized. 
It is not surprising that most of the recorded cases involve 
some version of the marriage described in Category1• This was a 
much less mobile country in the past and couples were less likely 
to move to a new state to start a new life. It was much easier to 
cross a border to celebrate a marriage where it was permitted, 
but then to return to one's domicile and to one's job, family, and 
friends. 
For purposes here, the question is whether a state will rec-
ognize a marriage between same-sex partners that was validly 
celebrated in another state. Many states have already passed 
statutes that suggest that the state will not recognize a same-sex 
marriage regardless of when or where it was celebrated.37 While 
these statutes will have to be construed by the courts, one possi-
ble reading of them is that they not only apply to marriages de-
scribed in Category~> but also apply to the marriages described in 
Category2 and Category3• 
37. Ga. Code Ann.§ 19-3-3.1 (b) (Lexis 1999): 
No marriage between persons of the same sex shall be recognized as entitled to 
the benefits of marriage. Any marriage entered into by persons of the same sex 
pursuant to a marriage license issued by another state or foreign jurisdiction or 
otherwise shall be void in this state. Any contractual rights granted by virtue of 
such license shall be unenforceable in the courts of this state and the courts of 
this state shall have no jurisdiction whatsoever under any circumstances to grant 
a divorce or separate maintenance with respect to such marriage or otherwise to 
consider or rule on any of the parties' respective rights arising as a result of or in 
connection with such marriage. 
Ala. Code§ 30-1-19 (e) (Lexis 1998) ("The State of Alabama shall not recognize as valid 
any marriage of parties of the same sex that occurred or was alleged to have occurred as 
a result of the law of any jurisdiction regardless of whether a marriage license was is-
sued."); Va. Code Ann. § 20-45.2 (Lexis 2000) ("A marriage between persons of the 
same sex is prohibited. Any marriage entered into by persons of the same sex in another 
state or jurisdiction shall be void in all respects in Virginia and any contractual rights cre-
ated by such marriage shall be void and unenforceable.") 
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Koppelman wishes to defend the "modest claim" that were 
one of the states to recognize same-sex marriages, no state 
would be required by local law to refuse to recognize such mar-
riages for all purposes. (p. 98) Yet, if state and federal constitu-
tional guarantees are bracketed, Koppelman's modest claim may 
nonetheless be too bold. Many states have articulated strong 
public policy statements against recognizing same-sex marriage, 
and the question at hand is whether a state legislature could bind 
the state's courts in all cases to refuse to give any effect to such 
marriages. 
Koppelman suggests that "a blanket rule of non-recognition 
would be a radical departure from pre-existing choice-of-law 
principles and should not be adopted." (p. 102) He is correct 
both that this would be a radical departure and that this would 
be unwise, but those points address the choice-of-law rules that 
states should adopt. A different issue is whether as a matter of 
existing law courts have the discretion that he believes that they 
should, and yet another issue is whether the laws that might be 
crafted in the future in different state legislatures would none-
theless give judges "a free hand to craft sensible conflicts rules." 
(p. 116) It is not at all clear that states do or must permit their 
courts to have discretion to recognize same-sex marriages for 
particular purposes or for any purpose, even if the states would 
be wise to do so.38 
Koppelman discusses two important marriage cases that fall 
into Category2• Each case involved an interracial couple who had 
validly celebrated their marriage in their domicile, and then had 
subsequently moved to a jurisdiction which would not have per-
mitted them to marry had they been domiciled in the latter ju-
risdiction at the time of the marriage. Koppelman notes that the 
two state supreme courts reached different conclusions with re-
spect to the validity of the interracial marriages before them, but 
he then uncharacteristically fails to offer the kind of deep analy-
sis of the cases that he offers elsewhere. This is regrettable, be-
cause these cases cry out for examination. 
In State v. Bell,39 the Supreme Court of Tennessee refused 
to recognize an interracial marriage validly celebrated in Missis-
sippi. The Bell court cited examples of cases where a state could 
38. This is assuming for the sake of argument that no state or federal constitutional 
guarantees require recognition of same-sex marriages for certain purposes or under cer-
tain conditions. 
39. 66 Tenn. 9 (1872). 
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refuse to recognize a marriage validly celebrated in another 
domicile-incest and polygamy40-and then said that because 
the marriage before the court was no less revolting or unnatural 
than those,41 the state could refuse to recognize the interracial 
marriage as well. 
The difficulty here was that the court was using the wrong 
test, which traditionally was not whether the marriage was 
viewed in the forum with great distaste but instead whether the 
marriage was either incestuous or polygamous. The distaste test 
would simply have been too easy to meet, since the marriage 
would not even have been challenged unless the state had articu-
lated a strong public policy against such marriages. Basically, the 
Bell court implied that the same standard for non-recognition 
should be used for marriages in Category1 and Category2, and 
that a marriage violating an important public policy simply 
should not be recognized regardless of whether it was valid in 
the domicile at the time of its celebration. Yet, marriages in 
these two different categories were traditionally treated quite 
differently, at least in part, because the former was celebrated 
even though the couple was on notice that their domicile pre-
cluded the marriage, whereas the latter was celebrated when the 
couple might reasonably and justifiably have believed that their 
legally permitted marriage would continue to be recognized. 
It may well be that the Bell court was sensitive to the diffi-
culty posed by its treating marriages in Category1 and Category2 
in the same way, for it did not even mention that the marria~e at 
issue had been validly celebrated in a different domicile.4 In-
deed, the Tennessee Supreme Court does not make that point 
clear until it issues a different decision seventeen years later in 
which the court explains what was at issue in Bell.43 
In State v. Ross44 the North Carolina Supreme Court used 
the traditional test to determine whether a marriage validly 
40. Id. at 11. 
41. Id. 
42. The court writes, "The question to be determined is, does a marriage in Missis-
sippi protect persons who live together in this State in violation of the act of the General 
Assembly of the 27th of June, 1870?" Id. at 9. Here, the court does not even mention 
where the parties were domiciled at the time of the marriage. 
43. One needs to consult Pennegar & Haney v. State, 10 S.W. 305 (Tenn. 1889) to 
find out that the parties in Bell were domiciled in Mississippi at the time of the marriage. 
See id. at 307 ("in State v. Bell, 7 Baxt. 9, this Court held that a marriage between a white 
person and a negro, valid in Mississippi where celebrated, was void here, in a case 
whether the parties were domiciled in Mississippi at the time of the marriage"). 87 Tenn. 
244,251. 
44. 76 N.C. 242 (1877). 
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celebrated in another domicile would be recognized. The court 
held that because the marriage validly celebrated in the domicile 
was neither polygamous nor incestuous,45 it would be recog-
nized.46 The North Carolina Supreme Court would not have rec-
ognized the interracial marriage validly celebrated in South 
Carolina had the degree of distaste been the relevant test, since 
the court made clear how offensive it found the marriage.47 In-
deed, when the State Attorney-General suggested that the state 
need not recognize the interracial marriage validly celebrated in 
a different domicile because "a marriage between persons of dif-
ferent races is as unnatural and revolting as an incestuous one,"48 
the court rejected that argument and instead pointed out that 
"[i]t is impossible to identify this case with that of an incestuous 
or polygamous marriage."49 The court decided that the costs as-
sociated with not recognizing a non-polygamous, non-incestuous 
marriage validly celebrated in the domicile at the time of cele-
bration were simply too great, and recognized the marriage.50 
One would be wrong to infer from the Ross decision, how-
ever, that North Carolina did not believe that interracial mar-
riages violated an important public policy. In the very same year 
in which Ross was decided, the North Carolina Supreme Court 
refused to recognize an interracial marria?e celebrated in South 
Carolina by North Carolina domiciliaries.5 
Ko_ppelman correctly notes that a federal court in Ex parte 
Kinney"· suggests that a state would not have to recognize an in-
terracial marriage validly celebrated in another domicile were 
the couple to have subsequently emigrated to the state. Yet, 
Koppelman does not seem to appreciate how Kinney may un-
dercut the ability of states to refuse to recognize same-sex mar-
riages validly celebrated elsewhere in certain circumstances. 
The Kinney court discussed three different scenarios, one 
from Category~> one from Category2, and one from Category3• 
The actual case before the court fell into Category1, since it in-
volved an interracial marriage celebrated by Virginia domi-
ciliaries who had attempted to evade local law by marrying in 
45. See id. at 245-46. 
46. See id. at 247 (the marriage would be recognized because neither polygamous 
nor incestuous). 
47. See id. at 246 (discussing how "revolting" the marriage was to the court). 
48. Id. at 245. 
49. Id. at 247. 
50. See id. 
51. See State v. Kennedy, 76 N.C. 251 (1877). 
52. 14 F. Cas. 602 (E.D. Va. 1879). 
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the District of Columbia. The court believed this an easy case 
and held the marriage void. 
While recognizing that the case would have been more diffi-
cult had the couple validly celebrated their marriage in their own 
domicile before moving to Virginia,53 the court ultimately con-
cluded that the United States Constitution would not require 
Virginia to recognize such a marriage. Thus, the court believed 
that the United States Constitution would not preclude Virginia 
from refusing to recognize marriages in Category1 and in Cate-
gory2. However, the court offered a different position when ana-
lyzing cases in Category3, suggesting that if an interracial couple 
had celebrated their marriage in their domicile of the District of 
Columbia and then had merely traveled through Virginia, the 
state would have been constitutionally required to recognize the 
marriage, local policy notwithstanding.54 
Koppelman suggests that Kinney held that "even conceding 
a state's right to outlaw interracial marriages, that state was obli-
gated to make reasonable accommodation of those states that 
held different views on the miscegenation question." (p. 113) 
Yet, Kinney was not offering an accommodation theory but was 
instead offering an analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment and 
privileges and immunities protections afforded by the United 
States Constitution. 
The Kinney court's conclusion that the Fourteenth 
Amendment offers no protection for interracial marriages55 is 
simply no longer good law.56 What is more interesting is the 
Kinney court's suggestion that privileges and immunities guaran-
tees would protect the interracial marriage of individuals travel-
ing through a particular state.57 At least two points might be 
made about such a suggestion. First, this means that states refus-
ing to recognize marriages in Category3 may be violating privi-
leges and immunities guarantees. Second, given Saenz v. Roe58 in 
which the Court suggested that privileges and immunities guar-
antees are not only implicated when one visits a state but may 
also be implicated when one emigrates to a new state, states re-
fusing to recognize marriages in Category2 may also be violating 
privileges and immunities guarantees. 
53. See id. at 606. 
54. ld. 
55. Id. at 605. 
56. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967). 
57. Kinney, 14 F. Cas. at 606. 
58. 526 U.S. 489 (1999). 
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Any discussion of the interstate recognition of same-sex 
marriages must examine the Defense of Marriage Act. The Act 
has two sections, one defining marriage for federal purposes and 
the other discussing the full faith and credit that would be due to 
same-sex marriages in other states. Koppelman suggests that the 
former would seem difficult to challenge on constitutional 
grounds. (p. 128) Yet, Koppelman's pessimism may not be justi-
fied, given the unprecedented nature of Congress's refusal to de-
fer to state definitions of marriage (p. 136) and the Court's hav-
ing explained that Congress can only supplant state law in these 
kinds of matters where important federal interests would 
thereby be protected.59 
Koppelman rightly suggests that Romer might helpfully be 
used to establish the unconstitutionality of DOMA. One might 
consult the Congressional Record to see the impermissible moti-
vation of (some of) those supporting DOMA and, as Koppelman 
suggests, the statute on its face suggests invidious purpose. (p. 
139) Thus, even were the Court to reject that invidious motiva-
tion could be inferred from the comments of particular members 
of Congress,60 the unprecedented nature of DOMA and the 
breadth of the burden that it imposes on certain individuals 
should be enough to make DOMA's invidiousness clear. 
In his epilogue, Koppelman criticizes Justice Johnson who 
suggests in her concurrence in Baker v. State61 that Vermont 
should recognize same-sex marriage rather than permit a differ-
ent status-civil unions-to be created. Koppelman writes, "If 
same-sex marriage really is required by high principle-and 
Amestoy and Johnson both agree that it is-then it is no light 
thing to act in a way that makes it less rather than more likely 
that such marriages will in fact be recognized and remain so." (p. 
144) Basically, he believes that had the Vermont court found 
same-sex marriage protected by the Vermont Constitution, then 
the constitution would have been changed by the electorate. For 
support that such a result would occur, he points to what hap-
pened in both Alaska and Hawaii, namely, those state constitu-
59. See Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619,625 (1987) (citing Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 
U.S. 572,581 (1979) (quoting United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966)) ("Before a 
state law governing domestic relations will be overridden, it 'must do "major damage" to 
"clear and substantial" federal interests"'). 
60. Cf. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) ("It is a familiar principle 
of constitutional law that this Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional stat-
ute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive.") 
61. 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). 
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tions were changed to prevent the states from recognizing same-
sex marriage. (p. 142) 
Yet, Koppelman rightly suggests that the Hawaii Supreme 
Court deserves praise for having recognized the merit in the 
claim that the state's refusal to recognize same-sex marriage im-
plicated equal protection guarantees on the basis of sex, (p. 152) 
even though the Hawaii decision led to both a state constitu-
tional amendment in Hawaii and to Congress's passing the De-
fense of Marriage Act. The criticism made of Justice Johnson's 
concurrence and suggested remedy might also have been made 
of the Hawaii plurality opinion in Baehr v. Lewin,62 namely, that 
the decision did not seem likely to lead to the continued recogni-
tion of same-sex marriage, and some of the praise given to the 
Baehr opinion might also have been offered for Justice John-
son's concurrence. 
Koppelman's ambivalence about who deserves praise is un-
surprising. Very important interests are implicated in marriage, 
and the LGBT community is severely burdened by current mar-
riage laws. Civil union status, while less attractive than marital 
status, is nonetheless quite attractive-it offers emotional, finan-
cial, and symbolic benefits, which would not otherwise be avail-
able, both to same-sex partners and to any children that the cou-
ple might be raising. Courts are in the unenviable position of 
realizing what the law requires and also realizing the practical 
implications of issuing a decision which, although reflecting the 
law, is very unpopular. It is extremely regrettable that courts are 
put in such an untenable position, and the Baehr plurality and all 
members of the Baka court deserve praise for their implicit or 
explicit recognition that state refusals to recognize same-sex re-
lationships involves invidious discrimination. 
Koppelman addresses many of the legal issues that are im-
plicated by current state same-sex marriage bans and that will be 
implicated when some states finally recognize such unions. His 
analyses are both controversial and thought-provoking. While 
same-sex marriage proponents and opponents might disagree 
with the particular tacks that Koppelman takes, they all must 
admit that he helps to put many of the issues sharply into focus, 
itself no mean feat. 
62. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), reconsideration granted in part, 875 P.2d 225 (Haw. 
1993). 
